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Abstract
The internationalization of value chains and the broad proliferation of different public and private standards have 
led to a formalization and standardization of value chains, production systems and their constitutional actors and 
linkages in the Global South. Recent studies on the integration of Southern production systems in international 
value chains, however, show that this is only partly the case. These studies identify limits and insufficiencies of 
formal and standardized coordination and control systems as well as a neglect of regional peculiarities, individual 
aims and capabilities of the embedded stakeholders in the South by the coordinating lead firms from the North. 
As a result, informal actors and arrangements continue to be, and even continue to develop as, important parts of 
Southern production systems. With reference to the concept of informality, principal-agent theory and convention 
theory, this study aims to contribute to the recent conceptual debate on global value chains and global produc-
tion networks in outlining the importance of informal arrangements and non-industrial conventions as well as the 
limits to upgrading in South-North relationships. The empirical base are case studies on export-oriented primary 
production systems in Kenya (horticulture), Bangladesh (shrimps) and India/Bangladesh (leather).
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ZusammenfassungDie Internationalisierung von Wertschöpfungsketten sowie die weiträumige Verbreitung unterschiedlicher  öffentlicher und privater Standards haben mittlerweile auch im globalen Süden zu einer Formalisierung und Stan-dardisierung verschiedener Wertschöpfungsketten und Produktionssysteme sowie der diese konstituierenden Ak-teure und Vernetzungen geführt. Aktuelle Studien über die Integration von Produktionssystemen aus dem globalen Süden in internationale Wertschöpfungsketten weisen allerdings darauf hin, dass diese Entwicklung tatsächlich nur teilweise voranschreitet; sie zeigen darüber hinaus verschiedene Limitationen und Mängel bei formalen und standardisierten Koordinierungs- und  Kontrolmechanismen auf. Diese entstehen insbesondere, wenn solche Me-chanismen von Firmen aus dem Globalen Norden eingeführt werden, die dabei aber nicht die Besonderheiten, die individuellen Zielsetzungen und die Fähigkeiten der betroffenen Akteure aus dem globalen  Süden berücksichtigen. Dies führt dazu, dass informelle Akteure, Arrangements und Aktivitäten weiter als wichtige Teile südlicher Pro-duktionssysteme fortbestehen und sich teilweise sogar neue informelle Strukturen und Interaktionen herausbil-den. Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt auf der Grundlage von Ansätzen zu Informalität,  Prinzipal-Agenten-Ansätzen und der Konventionstheorie die Bedeutung solcher informeller Akteure, Arrangements und Aktivitäten in Süd-Nord-
Wertschöpfungsketten heraus und identifiziert hieraus resultierende Limitationen für das Upgrading. Damit trägt sie zur aktuellen konzeptionellen Debatte zu globalen Wertschöpfungs ketten und globalen Produktions systemen 
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1.  IntroductionLarge parts of the economies (in particular but not exclusively) in developing countries of the Global South are characterized by informal or partly infor-mal actors (e.g. informal subcontractors, informal intermediates), arrangements (e.g. informal trade agreements) and activities (e.g. informal production processes). In the past, the majority of Southern busi-nesses sold their products and services on domestic markets with few regulations. This fundamentally changed with globalization and the related global division of labour. Today, an ever-growing number of Southern producers sells directly or transmitted through global value chains to global and often North-ern buyers (Henderson et al. 2002, Gereffi et al. 2005). However, products and services sold internationally need to be compliant with international regulations and especially with the national laws of the markets they are sold to. Furthermore, they have to be in line with the formalized product and process standards of the buying companies and the value chains they are produced for (Dannenberg 2011). This rather sophis-ticated regulatory framework demands much higher degrees of formalization and standardization of pro-duction processes and related services. While it could be expected that this would lead to the exclusion of informal actors and practices in South-North value chains, various examples and shocking events (such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangla-desh in 2013 and the underlying violations of building standards, labour rights and health standards in the country’s garment industry) show that this is not ac-tually the case (Strasser et al. 2013). This paper shows that coordination and control struc-tures of today’s international value chains and con-ventions of doing business in these chains on the one hand and capabilities and interests of actors and their embeddedness in Southern regions with their par-ticular infrastructures, domestic conventions and socio-cultural settings on the other hand lead to pro-duction systems in which informal actors, arrange-ments and practices are not rare exceptions but com-mon and even constitutive elements. Further, we show that such informal arrangements and structures are 
hard to evaluate. They can, for instance, include posi-tive aspects, such as the (further) integration of small-scale businesses, as well as serious limitations for the development and competitiveness of the value chains with regard to product or process upgrading. Against 
this background, we first briefly discuss the concepts of global value chains and global production networks as an analytical framework to understand the coordi-nation and control mechanisms in international value chains. We aim to enrich this debate by linking it with 
reflections on standards, conventions and processes of upgrading (Section 2). We do this in outlining circum-stances which lead to or at least support certain forms of informality and show how these forms of informal-ity affect value chains (see Table 1). To do this, we use the examples of the Kenyan fresh fruit and vegetable production, the shrimp industry in coastal Bangladesh, and the Indian and Bangladeshi leather industries in order to illustrate and develop our conceptual argu-
ments (Section 3). By building on these specific exam-ples of value chains, we outline in how far the current approaches on value chains and production networks can be complemented by a better understanding of largely informal actors, arrangements and practices. The paper ends with a short conclusion summarizing 
our findings and discussing their relevance for the re-search in South-North value chains (Section 4).
2.  Conceptual considerations2.1  Global value chains and global production networksDuring the last decades, value chain approaches have become an important tool to describe and analyze the linkages between actors and the spatial patterns of economic activities. Classic value chain models de-scribe the path of a product from the raw material 
through various stages of production to the final prod-uct and delivery to the consumer, while more recent approaches  also focus on immaterial linkages and on power relationships between different actors in the chain (for an overview see e.g. Kulke 2007). The differ-ent forms of co-ordination between these actors are discussed by the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach. According to Gereffi et al. (2005), the specific form of 
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co-ordination is determined by the complexity of the knowledge transfer, the capability/competence of the 
actors involved and the level of codification of the in-formation. Between the two most extreme forms of co-ordination, market (for highly standardized products and a limited need for information transfer) and hi-erarchy (with high complexity of knowledge and high transaction costs), intermediate forms of coordination such as “modular”, “relational” and “captive” relation-
ships can be identified. GVC mainly focuses on the ver-tical coordination and organization within the chain. Alternative models such as the Global Production Net-work approach (GPN and its revised version GPN 2.0) also include horizontal and more network-like linkag-es (Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung and Coe 2015). Relationships between actors are considered in the dimensions of vertical and horizontal interdepend-encies which are marked by the dimensions of embed-dedness, power and value (Henderson et al. 2002). 
Even so there have been significant changes in the recent past, where Southern actors managed to up-grade their production processes and gain more sophisticated functions and powerful roles in the chains (e.g. in the electronics or diamond sector; 
Henn 2012; Fu et al.  2012); many actors in the Global South are still suppliers at the very end of the chain with limited capabilities, weak power resources and a low contribution to value creation (at least with regard to the share of revenues they receive). How-ever, as we outline below, they are often embedded 
in a very specific informal institutional, cultural and social context and different non-industrial conven-tions. This can help them to become or stay inte-grated in the international value chains but also may limit their potentials of upgrading within the chain. To analyze the organization of value chains between the Global North and the Global South, three aspects connected with the considerations of GVC and GPN are of special interest: the level of formality/informality (which is also conceptualized in convention theory), standardization as an important coordination and con-
trol mechanism (which will be linked with reflections on principal-agent problems between different actors in the chain), and the potential of upgrading production.
2.2  Informality and conventions As outlined above, informal arrangements play an  important role in business interactions in the Global 
South (Strasser 2015). Informal arrangements are 
usually based on oral exchange, only slightly codified 
and flexibly enforced based on social relationships. In contrast, formal business interactions are strongly 
codified and based on written contracts with the back-ground of abstract laws, regulations and formal institu-tions. However, there is not a simple binary distinction between formal and informal arrangements. Instead “informality may best be understood as a continuum of interrelated social processes and practices with dif-ferent degrees and qualities of (in)formality” (Etzold et al. 2009: 4). Written contracts can – for example – be replaced by oral arrangements based on personal trust between the relevant actors. The degree of the formal-ity or informality of different practices depends on the 
specific institutions and actors and the nature of social ties (Etzold et al. 2009, Strasser 2015). A useful approach to conceptualize formal and infor-mal practices in trade relations is convention theory (CT; for an overview from an economic perspec-tive, see e.g. Wilkinson 1997). The CT concept has only recently begun to receive more attention from researchers studying global commodity and value chains (e.g. Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Rosin 2008, Ponte 2009, Sage and Goldberger 2012, Bernzen and Braun 2014). However, CT provides a useful framework to explore how uncertainties and risks (e.g. lacking product quality or delivery reliability, risk of oppor-tunism) can be addressed in economic transactions, especially if these span borders, longer distances and different institutional contexts. What makes the CT approach particularly relevant to the analysis of transactions within value chains is its strong focus on different types of coordination between suppli-ers and buyers. Moreover, the concept sheds light on the ways trading partners deal with uncertainty by drawing on different conventions (or worlds of justi-
fication) with distinct modes of evaluation. Several forms of conventions have been distinguished in the academic literature (see e.g. Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999, Rosin 2007): most importantly “mar-ket” (short-term market relations evaluated by price, competitiveness), “industrial” (based on standardi-
zation, efficiency), “domestic” (based on reputation, trust, tradition), “civic” (based on collective interest), and “opinion” (public opinion, renown). Such differ-ent conventions can be contrary to each other (e.g. 
state regulations which are in conflict with social and cultural norms; Pauls and Franz 2013). Recent find-ings by Bernzen and Braun (2014) for international 
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organic food chains show that while industrial con-
ventions such as standards and third-party certifica-
tions (industrial) have gained increasing significance in recent years; other ways to ensure quality for buy-ers and consumers can coexist and are still relevant. Less tangible forms of coordination such as mutual trust established through relationship management and the building up of reputation are still important factors for successful transactions and the reduction of uncertainty, especially if the partners of the trans-actions are institutionally, socially and culturally “distant” from each other (see also Bernzen 2014). 
These findings suggest that formal and informal in-stitutions and conventions not only coexist within the same value chain, but that they can be closely en-tangled even within the same transaction. 
2.3  Standards and principal-agent problems Standards are important instruments to ensure high product and process quality and to achieve upgrad-ing of products and processes. Standardization can be widely observed in international value chains all over the world (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). While a national production system is integrated into a homogeneous institutional framework (i.e. regarding laws and regu-lations), this is generally not the case for international value chains. Strong differences especially occur be-tween the countries of the Global North and devel-oping countries. So far, only very few international regulations exist to control global business relations and, even where regulations exist, their enforcement 
is often difficult (Riisgaard 2009). However, national 
laws of the final markets as well as customers and consumers demand compliance with different prod-uct (e.g. quality and safety) and process requirements (e.g. labour and environmental standards; Nadvi and 
Wältring 2002). As a result, there is an increasing de-mand for regulation and control on an international level to ensure that such requirements have been met 
before the products reach their final markets.
To fulfill this demand, the lead firms of international value chains are increasingly using international pri-vate business standards (Nadvi 2008). While product standards can usually be controlled ex-post, this is not possible for most processes. Therefore, frequent con-trols of the entire production process are necessary, but hard to achieve. This bears the possibility that standards are not met; e.g. if the producers or other ac-tors in the value chain can gain advantages by not ful-
filling the standards’ requirements or are not able to 
fulfill them (Dannenberg and Nduru 2013). In such cas-
es, the objective of the lead firm would not be reached. In developing countries, the introduction of private standards and other buyer requirements are often serious threats which can lead to the exclusion of large numbers of small producers who are not able to 
fulfill these requirements (Riisgaard 2009). This can have a serious impact on other actors of the regional 
industry whose turnovers and profits are dependent on the supply base provided by small-scale produc-ers (e.g. middlemen and exporters). These down-stream actors aim to keep their supply base even if 
this is in conflict with the objectives of their buyers. In such situations, it is likely that informal arrange-ments are developed in order to bypass the stand-ards and related controls so that the suppliers can remain in the chain (Dannenberg and Nduru 2013). The problems of different actors with individual ob-jectives are depicted in principal-agent models (P-A models; see e.g. Grossman and Hart 1983, Hirschauer 2004). P-A models are used to analyze the microeco-nomic situation of buyers (principals) and sellers/producers (agents) with different interests and with asymmetric information access. Typically, four prob-lems can occur: hidden product characteristics, hid-den information, hidden action and hidden intention. In international value chains where large numbers of contractors and subcontractors are involved, it is dif-
ficult to collect information on all the characteristics (e.g. capabilities, objectives) of the agents involved so that problems of hidden characteristics can occur and suboptimal contractors are chosen. While prob-lems of hidden information (e.g. on the real quality of a product) can be reduced through product standards, process-oriented standards can barely be controlled ex-post so that hidden actions in processing can be ex-pected. According to the power asymmetry between buyers and suppliers, hidden intention problems of the agents (e.g. the danger of a hold-up) are less likely but can occur vice-versa (e.g. if a producer is forced to sell perishable products under price). 
2.4  Potentials of upgradingOpportunities and the potential for upgrading eco-nomic activities are of central importance for eco-nomic development in the Global South (Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003). Upgrading within value chains 
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can improve competitiveness, open up new economic pathways, reduce dependencies from Northern lead-
ing firms, and improve the overall social and environ-mental situation in production regions of the Global South. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) distinguish four 
types of upgrading: (1) Process upgrading is defined as improvement in the production process based on investment in new technologies and operational pro-cedures; this allows cost reductions but also improve-
ment in the environmental performance of a firm or the implementation of higher health and safety stand-ards for workers and consumers. (2) Product upgrad-ing means improvement in the goods produced ei-
ther by product diversification or by better product qualities; this opens up the possibility to increase the 
value added. With (3) functional upgrading, the firms 
are fulfilling additional responsibilities in product development (R&D), marketing or distribution. (4) 
Inter-sectoral upgrading is defined as inter-sectoral 
diversification, e.g. by tapping into new markets and product lines. All kinds of upgrading do not only have an economic dimension but can also affect social and environmental aspects. However, the realization of 
upgrading is strongly influenced by specific frame-work conditions and different realities in different 
value chains. Usually, a decisive role is attributed to 
the lead firms that govern and coordinate the respec-
tive value chains (e.g. the willingness of the lead firm 
for knowledge transfer, the ability of the lead firm to implement standards as well as effective forms of supervision and advice etc.; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Giuliani et al. 2005). Moreover, the abilities of upstream suppliers to realize innovations or the sup-port of public institutions, business associations and NGOs also have a strong impact on the level and forms of upgrading that can be achieved (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2002). However, in the following section we shall mainly focus on the interplay between formal-ity and informality, the roles of process standards and conventions, and the impact on the structure of the value chains. As functional and inter-sectoral upgrad-ing is hard to achieve for small primary producers, we shall focus our case studies on the possibilities and limitations of product and process upgrading.
3.  Realities in different value chains The empirical case studies of different primary pro-duction-based value chains will exemplarily highlight in how far the outlined processes and elements and 
their manifestations in specific environments in the 
Global South can significantly shape the structures, interactions and dynamics of the value chains and the perspectives of businesses within these chains. The empirical case studies are all based on rich quantita-
tive and qualitative data sets of extensive field stud-ies conducted by the authors of this paper and their research teams. These include:  – a quantitative survey of 170 export-oriented fresh fruit and vegetable farmers in the Mt. Kenya region as well as additional interviews with experts and stakeholders along the international value chain (empirical analysis 2008-2010; see Dannenberg and 
Nduru 2013, Dannenberg 2012); – an in-depth qualitative survey of more than 30 Bangladeshi shrimp farmers and several shrimp processing plants in and around Khulna and 
 Chittagong as well as additional firm and stake-holder interviews along the international value chain (empirical analysis 2006-2010; see Dietsche and Braun 2008; Dietsche 2011);  – a quantitative analysis of 119 tanneries in Dhaka combined with semi-structured interviews with further producers, processors and traders along Bangladesh´s leather industry and the internation-al value chain as well as supporting expert inter-views (empirical analysis 2011-2014; Strasser 2015, 
Strasser et al. 2013); – a qualitative survey of around 40 leather produc-ing, leather processing or leather trading compa-nies in Kanpur (India) as well as additional expert interviews and a survey of 200 leather and leather good importers in Europe (empirical analysis 2006-2010; Braun and  Dietsche 2008, Dietsche 2011). 
3.1 Informal arrangements in standardized chains – the case of the Kenyan fresh fruit and vegetable industry The Kenyan fresh fruit and vegetable industry has been analyzed in various studies and has generally been considered a success story for the integration of Southern small-scale producers in international  value chains (Dijkstra 1997, Dolan and Humphrey 2004, Ouma 2010, Dannenberg and Kulke 2014). Great attention has been paid to the introduction of the pri-vate process-oriented standard GlobalGAP as a quasi-mandatory requirement to supply European retailers 
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in the early 2000s (Dannenberg 2008, Ouma 2010, 
Dannenberg and Nduru 2013). Under the pressure of growing consumer awareness, GlobalGAP was devel-oped by a consortium of the majority of large Euro-pean food retailers as a risk management tool to pre-vent food scandals and guarantee transparency in the value chain (which can be regarded as a form of pro-cess upgrading). GlobalGAP was primarily oriented on the situation and capabilities of European produc-ers which included good transport infrastructure, an advanced regulatory framework, strict enforcement laws and highly capable modern producers (Dannen-
berg 2012). Studies concluded that the majority of small-scale family farmers with limited capabilities 
were not able to fulfill the standard, which led to their exclusion (see e.g. Graffham et al. 2007). While more recent studies underlined the insuf-ficient capabilities of Kenyan small-scale farmers to formally fulfill the GlobalGAP standard (at least on their own), they revealed that both farmers and Kenyan traders (exporters and middlemen in the production region) developed different informal arrangements to keep farms without a GlobalGAP certificate included in the chain (Dannenberg 2008, 
Ouma 2010). Dannenberg and Nduru (2013) identi-fied two different types of informal arrangements (with mixed types in between) which occurred in 
different trading routes of the Kenyan fresh fruit and vegetable value chain (see Fig. 1): 1. Informal arrangements in integrated and inter-nally controlled systems: In these arrangements, exporters, who are dependent on large domestic supply in order to achieve high turnovers, estab-
lished support systems to integrate non-certified farmers into the value chain. Even so, many farm-ers in these systems do not possess a GlobalGAP 
certificate; they are strictly controlled through 
quality management systems (QMS) and are fi-nancially supported and technically guided by the exporters. Here, most GlobalGAP requirements 
are fulfilled, but production costs are lower as the 
costs of formal certification are saved (e.g. auditing costs). Dannenberg (2008), Ouma (2010) as well as 
Dannenberg and Nduru (2013) found clear evidence that these practices were often known by European 
buyers but unofficially accepted as a form of com-promise based on reputation, trust and long-term relationship (domestic conventions; see Section 2). These arrangements of accepted compromise ap-pear in route B and partly in route E in Figure 1. 
2. Uncontrolled informal arrangements: In these  cases, the buyer (an exporter, a middleman, or anoth-
er farmer) buys non-certified and uncontrolled pro-
The paradox of formalization and informalization in South-North value chains
Fig. 1 Routes of Kenyan fresh fruits and vegetables exports from the farm gate through the value chain (Dannenberg and Nduru 
2013: 48) 
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duce from a farmer and mixes it with products from 
certified farmers (if the buyer is a farmer, it can also be their own produce) to enlarge the total volumes (typical for route type D in Fig. 1). Keeping in mind the process-oriented character of the GlobalGAP standard, such practices are hard to detect ex-post. Such arrangements are usually short term and mar-ket-based relationships. For the retailers (and their objective of a functional risk management systems), the consumers (and their objective of process con-
trol) and those certified farmers who get their pro-
duce mixed with uncertified produce, these arrange-ments are unfavourable and are, therefore, hidden. However, through these arrangements farmers and middlemen can remain integrated in the chain with-
out certification or the complex and relatively ex-pensive internal control system (this especially oc-curred in type D of the analyzed value chain).The Kenyan example demonstrates how informal ar-
rangements and hidden action can flourish in highly standardized value chains. They are even a result of the standardization itself and create an informal-
formal paradox. The case study shows the difficulties and limits of the introduction of a process standard to a developing country which has been developed in a Western institutional environment and is based on Western needs and objectives. As has been shown, 
such difficulties cannot only affect farmers in the Global South (e.g. through exclusion) but also the 
lead firms and the consumer end of the chain if the local conditions, capabilities and objectives of the principals are not taken into account.
3.2 Limits of standardization, traceability and  upgrading: the case of the Bangladesh shrimp industyShrimp production is of pivotal importance for Bangladesh’s economy. Next to the apparel industry, shrimps are the country’s second most important export commodity. In 2012, Bangladesh produced 87,500 tons of shrimp, the vast majority of which were exported to countries in the Global North, about 
50 per cent to the European Union alone (FAO 2014). Due to its location at the Bay of Bengal, the available areas of low-lying lands and the resulting abundant availability of water, the coastal areas of Bangladesh ideally meet the requirements of shrimp farming. In contrast to other important producing countries, Bangladeshi shrimps are cultivated rather exten-
sively. The shrimps feed in a mostly natural way and the ponds carry a relatively small number of animals. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi shrimps suffer from a bad reputation on international markets. Sound food safe-
ty and non-polluting breeding methods are difficult to achieve in practice (Dietsche and Braun 2008).Very few food commodities are as prone to ecological and hygienic risks as tropical shrimps. Health risks mainly stem from chemical or microbiological con-
tamination. Microbiological deficits are primarily at-tributed to inappropriate handling of the shrimps after harvest. To prevent an increased bacterial load and the risk of coli bacteria or salmonella, an unbroken cold chain from harvest to processing is of particular im-portance. Chemical contamination can be caused pre-dominantly by adding pesticides, animal pharmaceuti-cals and antibiotics for disease control (Dietsche 2011). In addition to food safety problems, negative environ-mental effects of shrimp production in Bangladesh are widely recognized. Local non-governmental organiza-tions (NGOs) and researchers repeatedly criticize the destruction of mangrove forests and the conversion of 
paddy fields into shrimp farms, both causing an increase of the soils’ salt content and, thus, limiting the land’s suitability for agricultural purposes (Karim 2006). An-other criticism relates to the collection of shrimp larvae in their natural breeding grounds, which causes large amounts of by-catch and, thus, poses an immense threat 
to the populations of numerous fish species (PDO- ICZMP 2003). Consequently, farmers are obliged by law to obtain their larvae exclusively from professional hatcheries. However, the wild catch of shrimp larvae is still a common (informal) practice despite the ban.Environmental effects of shrimp farming in Bang-ladesh and health risks emerging from shrimp con-sumption are increasingly being covered by media re-ports in Europe and in other importing countries such 
as the US and Japan. As a consequence, food safety and environmental problems lead to substantial corporate risks for importers that result e.g. from legal sanc-tions, civil society pressure or consumer boycotts. The 
significant probability of antibiotic contamination of shrimps from Bangladesh and numerous reports on environmental problems related to shrimp culture led to several importers discontinuing their orders and choosing safer supplier countries. For this reason, the high prevalence of contamination and the problematic environmental conditions pose an ongoing and serious threat for the Bangladeshi shrimp sector.
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A promising option to strengthen the position of Bangladesh in the global shrimp market is product and process upgrading and, in particular, the produc-tion of organic shrimps which would achieve higher prices and make better use of the country’s favourable natural conditions. To ensure high quality standards and to minimize negative environmental impacts, more and more European buyers are expanding their 
product range with certified organic shrimps. Bangla-
desh, however, has not been able to benefit from this global trend towards organic food (Dietsche and Braun 2008). The shrimp industry in Bangladesh has not yet been able to secure high product quality standards and to develop new forms of organization that meet changing consumer preferences and increasing envi-ronmental awareness in major export markets. Although there have been several attempts to intro-duce reliable process standards or pilot projects of 
organic shrimp farming, the fundamental problems of the Bangladeshi shrimp sector continue to exist. Nei-ther European importers nor Bangladeshi exporting 
firms can guarantee consistently high product qual-ity and compliance with fundamental environmental standards. A major reason for this is the highly seg-mented character of the value chain within Bangla-desh (Fig. 2). Shrimps run through a multitude of pro-duction and intermediate trade stages (Dietsche 2011, 
Huq 2015). Especially the complex middleman system 
makes it very difficult for international lead firms to 
fulfill consumer demands for reliable environmental and health standards. As a result, the highly segment-ed organization of the sector is a considerable obsta-cle for the implementation of quality and ecological process standards. On the one hand, the farmers do not have enough capital and know-how to diversify their business towards more organic production methods. On the other hand, international buyers are often not able to acquire information on the true ori-gin of the shrimps due to the highly segmented com-modity chain. Reliable traceability of the produce is almost impossible under these circumstances.The example of the Bangladeshi shrimp industry  demonstrates that process and product upgrading is hard to achieve and stricter (environmental) process standards are hard to implement when (1) value chains are highly segmented and (2) informal practices domi-nate many transactions within the chain. In this situ-
ation, the ability of lead firms to organize and coor-dinate the chains can be rather limited, even though market demand and consumer preferences might be supportive of product and process upgrading. 
3.3 Informality, niche markets and upgrading – the  cases of the Bangladeshi and Indian leather industriesFor our last industry example, we use the empirical 
findings of the formal and informal arrangements of leather production (Strasser et al. 2013, Strasser 2015) in Dhaka/Bangladesh. Insights from the leath-er and leather products’ cluster of Kanpur in north-
ern India confirm and complement these findings (Braun and Dietsche 2008). In both cases, a contin-uum of formal and informal activities and arrange-ments could be observed, and formal and informal activities are often present in parallel in the same step of the commodity chain. Especially in produc-
tion, the level of formalization is strongly influenced by the size of and investment in economic activities. 
The paradox of formalization and informalization in South-North value chains
Fig. 2 The shrimps value chain between Bangladesh and Europe. 
Source:  Dietsche and Braun 2008, slightly adapted
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In the Dhaka leather production cluster, small in-formal units produce footwear for the local mar-ket, while formally registered large enterprises with modern machinery produce high-quality bags for the global market (see Fig. 3; Strasser 2015). A rather similar structure can be found in Kanpur’s leather industry. Larger companies produce fashion and safety shoes for international markets, whereas smaller units either produce for downstream local buyers or exportable niche products such as horse-riding equipment (saddles, harnesses etc.).There are temporary differences in formal and infor-mal organization. This is particularly obvious in the Dhaka case. During Eid-ul-Azha, the important Mus-
lim sacrifice festival, a huge number of animals are 
slaughtered and sacrificed within a short period of time (Strasser et al. 2013). This temporary oversup-ply of raw hides and skins enables additional infor-mal middlemen to enter the supply chain. However, these temporary middlemen lack experience and 
competence and because of this influence quality and prices. Looking at the economic units, formal and informal arrangements are both constitutive 
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ele ments of their internal activities. The employment of workers for simple activities is informally organ-
ized while qualified technicians are employed based on written contracts, are registered and enjoy addi-
tional benefits. Investment based on credits is nor-mally formalized. Relationships to supply are partly informal – e.g. between the tanneries and the tempo-rary middlemen during Eid-ul-Azha – and partly for-mal – e.g. to the permanent buying houses/brokers for skins. This brief description of the results shows that formality and informality can be addressed as a continuum of different levels of arrangements that are parallel and temporary. This continuum forms a constitutive element of economic activities in the Dhaka and Kanpur leather industries alike.Between formality and informality and the potential for upgrading, interdependencies can be observed. There seems to be the tendency that the formaliza-tion of arrangements forms a basis for mutual in-formation exchange and, thus, opens up possibili-
ties for upgrading. Upgrading potential exists both in the vertical dimension between production steps and in the horizontal dimension between actors in 
Fig. 3 Multi-tiered subcontracts in the 
Dhaka leather goods and footwear 
(LGF) industry. Source: Strasser 
2015: 205
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the same step of production. In the leather industry, 
lead firms produce leather articles (e.g. shoes, bags) and establish permanent relationships with tanner-
ies; they influence these tanneries to deliver better quality (Dietsche 2011, Strasser 2015). Information 
exchange concerning the specific defined quality standards enables tanneries to realize product and process upgrading. On the same step of production, 
relationships between lead firms and subcontractors are important for upgrading. Sometimes tanneries do not have the capacity to process all the hides/skins during periods of oversupply; they then employ sub-contractors and transfer knowledge to produce com-parable quality according to their own standards. This enables the subcontractors to upgrade their production. In many cases, however, these small sub-
contractors only perform the first and rather dirty steps of the tanning process and are, therefore, not 
able to fully benefit from the relationship with larger and more internationally exposed companies.The upgrading of the Bangladeshi and northern In-
dian leather industries is mainly based on inter-firm relations. Implemented process standards only play an important role for higher priced fashion products or safety shoes (quality-oriented coordination in 
Fig. 4). Processes in small-scale tanneries and pro-duction units that focus on low-quality niche mar-kets with dominant non-industrial conventions are much less formally controlled (price-driven market relationship in Fig. 4). Moreover, up to now, upgrad-
ing in the Bangladeshi and northern Indian leather industries – where it exists – is mainly oriented to-wards economic dimensions to improve the competi-
tiveness of firms. The dimensions of environmental upgrading – e.g. by reducing the negative environ-mental effects of the production process – and of so-cial upgrading – e.g. by improving the working condi-tions of the employees – are still widely neglected.
4.  Conclusions Our case studies from Kenya, Bangladesh and India show that informal actors, arrangements and prac-tices continue to be important elements of production systems in the Global South, even if they are closely linked by commercial value chains to the large and highly regulated consumer markets of the Global 
North. These findings confirm former studies that show that formal and informal institutions and differ-ent conventions do not only coexist within the same value chain but can be entangled even within the same transaction (Bernzen and Braun 2014). We found extensive informality in all three different industries, even though they were characterized by different product characteristics, different institu-tional frameworks and different value chain struc-tures (see Figs. 1-3). While e.g. many segments of the leather industry are marked by very limited indus-trial conventions and the fresh fruit and vegetables 
Fig. 4 Three types of chain coordination in the 
northern Indian leather industry. Source: 
Braun and Dietsche 2008, slightly 
 adapted
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chain is characterized by strong industrial conven-tions, informal actors, arrangements and production practices occurred in both cases. This strongly indi-cates that informality continues to be a broad and common feature of South-North value chains even in relatively standardized chains. However, as outlined in Table 1, our results show that the characteristics of informality, the effects of informality and the rea-
sons for informality differ significantly.  Informal institutions exist in parallel or in combi-nation with much more formal structures such as formal employment or international product and process standards. A clear empirical distinction be-
tween formal and informal activities is often impos-sible. This means that informality is not so much a distinct entity or sub-sector within otherwise for-mal economies and value chains, but rather a more general logic of doing things, getting things done, and keeping small production units included in glo-balizing value chains. Activities that take place in South-North value chains should, therefore, be seen within a formal-informal continuum. Standardization of production processes does not necessarily lead to a weakening of informal arrange-ments. Quite to the contrary, as the Kenyan case study shows, the introduction of standards can even lead to 
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 Case study: 
Fresh fruit and vegetables 
Case study: Shrimps Case studies: Leather 
Major 
characteristics 
of informality  Informal actors (sub-suppliers) 
 Informal arrangements  
 Hidden actions at farm and trade levels 
 Informal production practices 
 Informal actors (sub-suppliers at the very supply end and mostly informal middlemen) 
 Informal practices and arrangements 
 Hidden actions on farm and pre-farm levels 
 Seasonal variation in the organization of supply chains continuum of formal and informal activities and arrangements 
 Informal actors (producers and processors; temporary middlemen as constitutive elements of international activities) 
Important effects 
of informality 
 Positive: integration of small businesses into the chain 
 Negative: loss of transparency, intended risk management of the standard GlobalGAP undermined   
 Positive: integration of small businesses into the chain 
 Negative: no consistent quality control, traceability of produce almost impossible 
 As a result: upgrading difficult and reliable product and process standards hard to achieve 
 Positive: integration of small businesses into the chain 
 Partly opens up possibilities for product upgrading 
 Negative: only few businesses benefit, very little upgrading in terms of environmental, health, and safety standards 
Main reasons for 
the existence of 
informality in 
the chain  
 Lack of capabilities of producers 
 P-A problems 
 Domestic conventions and strong industrial conventions which are hard to fulfil and force producers to develop informal activities 
 Reaction on quasi mandatory standards as a result of power asymmetries 
 Lack of capabilities of producers 
 Highly segmented character of the value chain makes formal standardization of processes almost impossible and industrial conventions ineffective 
 Undersupply of raw material and oversupply of processing capacities 
 Information deficits of international buyers 
 Lack of capabilities of small producers 
 Very limited industrial conventions and control in some sections of the industry 
 Temporary oversupply of raw material due to religious peculiarities   
 
Table 1 Characteristics, effects of and reasons for informality in different North-South value chains (own analysis) 
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the emergence of new informal arrangements, actors, and practices, e.g. when formerly formal contractors 
are pushed into informality when they cannot fulfill 
sophisticated standards or afford expensive certifi-cation processes. This is particularly true in a busi-ness environment where the control of standards of the actual implementation of standard requirements 
is difficult (e.g. in countries with a weak institutional framework and/or few private control agencies) and in cases where the quality of products (e.g. for so-called credence goods) and/or the compliance with process requirements cannot be controlled ex-post. 
The need for rather flexible supply systems in vola-tile and cost-sensitive markets even makes complex combinations of formal and informal suppliers as well as formal and informal structures and arrangements more attractive and competitive than highly regulat-ed and formalized value chains.The complexity of informality in value chains, how-ever, can fundamentally limit opportunities for product and process upgrading. The latter is the case in the Indian and Bangladeshi leather industries where the seasonal emergence of relatively inexperi-
enced informal middlemen leads to a significant loss in product quality (as has been shown for the Dhaka case during Eid-ul-Azha). Furthermore, process up-
grading seems to be more difficult in value chains for niche products due to limited pressure from lead 
firms and consumers. The case of the shrimp sector in Bangladesh clearly demonstrates that highly seg-mented value chains with a large number of (mostly 
informal) middlemen can make it very difficult to implement effective product and process standards because the complexity of the chain makes the trace-ability of produce along the chain almost impossible. Improvements in product quality and the environ-mental situation in the production areas are, thus, hard to achieve. Thus, the effectiveness of formal quality standards and the chances for product and especially process upgrading are limited. Instead of formal standards, informal arrangements and rela-tionships as well as domestic and civic conventions are often the only effective way of “control” if buyers 
decide to source from a diffuse field of small subcon-tractors and/or highly segmented value chains. 
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